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Abstract 
 
I examine the determinants of cross-sectional liquidity in the IPO aftermarket during the 
period of 1995 through 2005. I find that past price performance, the extent of stock visibility, the 
mass of informed agents, and certain IPO attributes play a role in explaining IPO trading activity. 
My empirical evidence shows that differences of opinion and estimation uncertainty about an 
IPO firm affect little IPO liquidity. My findings contribute to the understanding of determinants 
of IPO aftermarket trading. I also investigate whether contemporaneous overreaction tends to 
occur following persistent information in the options market. More specifically, I compare the 
reactions between growth and value investors, and small and large investors conditional on past 
price reactions. My empirical results suggest that value investors react more strongly than growth 
investors following a series of prior information shocks, as measured by the cumulative level of 
overreaction. Small investors tend to react more strongly than large investors conditional on prior 
information shock, as measured by the cumulative sign or level of overreaction. The results 
imply that overreaction is a function of investor types and previous information and contribute to 
the overreaction hypothesis in the options market. 
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Introduction  
The first essay of my dissertation examines the determinants of cross-sectional liquidity 
in the IPO aftermarket. Previous studies focus on the factors of liquidity of seasoned stocks, 
whereas very few papers examine the factors of liquidity of newly-listed firms. Because IPO 
stocks typically experience a volatile trading period following the IPO issuance date, I draw on 
the literature on trading activities and IPO firms and explore the sources, if any, of IPO liquidity 
during the period of 1995 through 2005. I find that past price performance, the extent of stock 
visibility, the mass of informed agents, and certain IPO attributes play a role in explaining IPO 
trading activity. Previous literature suggests that differences of opinion and estimation 
uncertainty explain the share turnover of seasoned stocks. In contrast, I find that differences of 
opinion and estimation uncertainty about an IPO firm have little effect on IPO liquidity. My 
findings contribute to the understanding of determinants of IPO liquidity. 
The second essay investigates whether contemporaneous overreaction tends to occur 
following persistent information in the options market. While some studies test the overreaction 
hypothesis for ONE index fund in the options market, I focus on the comparison between growth 
and value investors conditional on past price reactions. The empirical evidence suggests that 
value investors react more strongly than growth investors following a series of prior information 
shocks, as measured by the cumulative level of overreaction.  Small investors tend to react more 
strongly than large investors conditional on prior information shock, as measured by the 
cumulative sign or level of overreaction. The results imply that overreaction is a function of 
investor types and previous information. The results provide additional evidence on the complex 
behavior of investors and suggest that value and growth investors react differently to 
information. 
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Chapter 1: The Determinants of Cross-Sectional Liquidity in the IPO 
Aftermarket 
Introduction  
This paper aims to study the cross-sectional variations in trading activity after firms 
undertake Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). To the author’s knowledge, there exits no 
comprehensive study on factors affecting liquidity of newly IPO firms. What can be inferred 
from previous research is that the months following the IPO offer date is a period of high trading 
activity (e.g., Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2002) and Corwin, Harris and Lipson (2004)). The 
reasons for the high trading activity, however, are not clear. In this study, I draw on the literature 
of trading volume and IPO to analyze the determinants of IPO liquidity. In short, I hypothesize 
that the amount of uninformed trading, the extent of uncertainty, dispersion of opinion, and IPO 
attributes explain the level of IPO liquidity. The results of this study could enhance our 
understanding of the determinants of liquidity, particularly of the newly-listed stocks. That is, the 
results may shed lights on the nature of IPO firms. Indeed, my empirical results indicate that the 
relative importance of several explanatory variables differ between the first half and second half 
year after the IPO issuance date. Moreover, I analyze three dimensions of liquidity: relative bid-
ask spread, share turnover, and price impact. The panel regression results sometimes differ 
among three liquidity measures, suggesting the relevance of examining various aspects of 
liquidity.  
Empirical research documents a noteworthy difference of liquidity between IPO and 
seasoned stocks. For example, Hedge and Miller (1989) find a significant difference in the bid-
ask spreads between IPOs and seasoned stocks. The spreads of IPO stocks are, on average, about 
three-fourths as large as those of seasoned stocks. Liquidity is important for IPO stocks, because 
a liquid market reduces the transaction cost and lowers trading volatility. Despite the importance 
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of liquidity in the IPO aftermarket, little research has examined the determinants of liquidity in 
the secondary market for IPO stocks.  
Given the fact that newly listed firms have no prior trading history and little publicly 
available information, I conjecture that IPO structure and visibility play a role in their higher 
trading activity. A great deal of finance literature has studied the IPO characteristics, such as 
short-term underpricing, price stabilization, venture capital backing, lockup period, and the role 
of investment banks. Some of the literature suggests that IPO characteristics have an impact on 
trading activities. For example, Field and Hanka (2001) find a permanent 40 percent increase in 
average trading volume following the expiration of lockup periods, during which insider selling 
is prohibited. They also document that the trading volume is larger when the IPO firm is 
financed by venture capital. Nonetheless, there is no comprehensive analysis to examine the 
relationship between these characteristics and liquidity in the IPO aftermarket.  
The most related study is Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2007), who demonstrate 
that uninformed trading, the extent of uncertainty, and dispersion of opinion have a significant 
impact on monthly turnover. They examine determinants of turnover for seasoned stocks. In 
contrast, I analyze IPO stocks. In so doing, I utilize both IPO and market microstructure 
literature to identify factors that may affect IPO liquidity. My main contributions therefore come 
from the development of factors that affect IPO trading. Moreover, I examine three aspects in 
liquidity, namely, relative bid-ask spreads, trading intensity, and price impacts, whereas Chordia, 
Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2007) look at only turnover that captures only one dimension of 
liquidity. Again, the empirical results differ among the three measures. 
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I run random effects models of IPO liquidity on a broad set of explanatory variables. Past 
return and return volatility form proxies for past price performance. I use firm size and price as 
proxies for a firm’s visibility. The mass of informed agents is proxied by the number of analysts 
following an IPO stock.  Forecast dispersion and financial leverage reflect the degree of 
differences of opinion and relative earnings surprises proxy for the extent of uncertainty about an 
IPO stock. I also examine IPO attributes including the presence of venture capital, the number of 
underwriters in a syndicate, and a dummy that represents hot/cold IPO market. The empirical 
evidence indicates that post-IPO trading activity depends on past price performance, stock 
visibility, informed agents, and certain IPO attributes. I find little evidence for differences of 
opinion and estimation uncertainty being important. As a robustness check, I address potential 
endogeneity problems by running random effects regressions of IPO liquidity on one-month 
lagged explanatory variables. The results largely confirm the importance of liquidity trading, the 
mass of informed agents, as well as particular IPO characteristics.  
The remaining sections of this essay are organized as follows. The next section reviews 
the related literature. Section 3 explains hypotheses and the choice of proxies. Section 4 
describes the data and summary statistics. I discuss the empirical results in Section 5 and address 
the possible endogeneity problems in Section 6. The last section concludes.  
Literature Review 
I first review the literature on IPO characteristics, which are expected to be relevant to the 
trading activity of IPO stocks. This is followed by the literature on the determinants of the 
liquidity of seasoned stocks, including uninformed trading, the extent of uncertainty, and 
dispersion of opinion. 
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IPO Characteristics 
A great deal of literature on IPO has examined unique IPO characteristics, including 
short-term underpricing, price stabilization, investment banks, and venture capital backing.  
Boehmer and Fishe (2000) suggest that underwriters create active aftermarket trading by 
underpricing IPOs. Fishe (2002) shows that stock flippers have the greatest effect on pricing in 
weak IPOs, compared to hot IPOs.1 Those findings suggest that both underwriters and market 
participants generate liquidity in the post-issuance trading of newly traded securities.   
Price stabilization that underwriters carry out in a short period (typically within 30 days) 
after the offering can also affect liquidity. If the stock price in the secondary market falls below 
the offer price, the lead manager may decide that the members of the syndicate need to stabilize 
the trading price. Price stabilization usually involves the combined use of aftermarket purchases, 
penalty bids2, short position, and overallotment option.3 Prabhala and Puri (1998) argue that 
underwriters stabilizing IPOs create liquidity in the aftermarket. Aggarwal (2000) shows that 
underwriters stimulate demand through short covering and overallotment option. Investment 
banks also restrict supply of IPO shares by penalty bids. Fishe (2002) theoretically demonstrates 
that in certain states, it may be optimal for an underwriter to exercise overallotment option. 
Those studies point out that the underwriters engaging in price stabilization play a role in the IPO 
aftermarket liquidity by managing both supply and demand of IPO shares.  
                                                 
1 Stock flippers refer to the buyers of IPO shares who sell IPO shares in the secondary market in a few days 
following IPO offer date. Although stock flippers usually increase the trading volume of IPO firms, they may cause 
the trading price of IPO shares to decline. 
2 Penalty bids refer to the forfeiture of selling concession by a lead manager of an underwritten syndicate. Members 
of a syndicate that distribute IPO shares receive compensation or selling concession from a lead manager. If the 
clienteles of distributing members sell their shares in a few days after the offering date (i.e., flipping shares), the lead 
manager of a syndicate may penalize those distributing members by forfeiting all or part of the selling concession as 
penalty bids.  
3 Overallotment option usually allows underwriters to buy additional 15 percentage of the number of issuance shares 
from issuing firms in a certain period after the offering date. As a result, the exercise of overallotment option by 
investment bankers tends to increase the supply of IPO shares in the secondary market.  
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Other potentially important factors for IPO aftermarket are the ranking of investment 
banks and the presence of venture capital. Prestigious underwriters tend to market only IPOs of 
high-quality firms. Carter and Manaster (1990) find a significant negative relationship between 
the level of prestige and the magnitude of underpricing. Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) rank 
investment banks by their market share on the basis of average deal size and number of IPOs 
underwritten (see Table III in their paper for the ranking). Wang and Yung (2008) find that 
reputable investment banks resolve a greater degree of uncertainty in an IPO, because those 
reputable underwriters are associated with more active filing price revisions and less secondary 
market return variability. Previous studies show that the involvement of venture capital is vital in 
IPO returns and liquidity. Brav and Gompers (1997) find that venture-backed IPOs outperform 
non-venture-backed IPOs using equal weighted returns. Moreover, Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
indicate that venture capitalists use inside information to time stock distributions. As a 
consequence, venture capitalists are able to influence the IPO liquidity by means of deliberately 
timing the market.  
Uninformed Trading 
Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfeiderer (1988) theorize that trading results from 
interaction of informed trader and uninformed traders (uninformed traders are sometimes 
referred to as liquidity traders). Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2007) show that uninformed 
trading measured by stock visibility and past returns explains a large portion of cross-sectional 
variations in the monthly turnover for a comprehensive sample of NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq 
stocks.  
 6
Extent of Uncertainty 
The extent of uncertainty affects the level of liquidity. Other things being equal, a higher 
degree of uncertainty motivates investor to trade and increases trading volume. Corwin, Harris, 
and Lipson (2004) find that uncertainty influences initial IPO liquidity. Initial buy-order is higher 
for IPO stocks with less uncertainty, and vice versa. Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000) and 
Aggarwal and Conroy (2002) suggest that market makers reduce the extent of uncertainty 
pertinent to price and volume by revising bid-ask quotes during the preopening period on the 
first day of trading.4 Ziebart (1990) documents that trading activity is positively associated with 
the absolute value of earnings surprises, which proxies for the extent of uncertainty. In their 
theoretical model, Ellul and Pagano (2006) demonstrate that investors who buy IPO shares take 
into account the extent of uncertainty measured by the expected after-market liquidity and 
liquidity risk. 
Dispersion of Opinion 
Varian (1989) and Harris and Raviv (1993) theorize that assets with more dispersion of 
opinion will have more trading volume in the framework of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Ofek 
and Richardson (2003) find a positive relationship between the IPO underpricing and 
heterogeneous beliefs among investors for Internet stocks. Boehmer and Fishe (2000) indicate 
that pessimistic investors flip shares to optimistic investors in the IPO aftermarket, since 
pessimistic investors have lower valuation regarding IPO stocks than optimistic investors. In 
short, the theoretical models and empirical studies indicate that dispersion of opinion among 
traders lead to higher liquidity.  
                                                 
4 Admati and  Pfleiderer (1988) theoretically suggest such actions. 
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Hypotheses and Variables  
Other things being equal, liquidity rises as estimation uncertainty about fundamental 
value increase. Relative absolute earnings surprises (RAES) form a proxy for post-issuance 
estimation uncertainty about a stock and is calculated as the earnings surprises (actual earnings 
minus forecast earnings) divided by forecast earnings. Information-based trading activity 
depends on the extent of information production. I conjecture that the number of informed agents 
(LANA) is positively linked to informed trading, where LANA is defined as the log of one plus 
the number of analysts following IPO stocks. 
Stock visibility and past price performance contribute to liquidity or noise trading. The 
theoretical model of Merton (1987) suggests that stock visibility draws the attention of individual 
investors in market equilibrium with incomplete information.  To proxy for stock visibility, I 
consider the measures of stock price, firm size, and book-to-market ratio. The stock price and 
firm size are calculated as the log of price (LSP) and market value of equity (LMV), respectively. 
The book-to-market ratio (BM) is estimated as the shareholders’ equity divided by the market 
value of equity. I hypothesize that the IPO firms associated with higher stock prices, larger firm 
size, or lower book-to-market ratios are more likely to experience more uninformed trading.  
The higher is the past return, the more is the informationless trading triggered by 
portfolio rebalancing needs in the IPO aftermarket. In particular, the well-know short-term 
underpricing is expected to considerably increase liquidity or noise trading for IPO stocks. On 
account of the possible impact of short-selling constraints on trading, following Chordia et al. 
(2007), past return is separated by up and down market into positive past return (RET+) and 
negative past return (RET−). RET+ and RET− are defined as the lagged one-month positive and 
negative return, respectively, and zero otherwise. Gomes (2005) theorizes a model of portfolio 
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choice and stock trading volume and suggests a positive correlation between trading volume and 
stock return volatility.  In addition to the level of past return, I incorporate the volatility of price 
return (SDPR)5, defined as the standard deviation of present daily returns, to account for 
liquidity or noise trading.    
Based on the theoretical model of Varian (1895, 1989), I hypothesize that a higher level 
of differences of opinion will result in more trading activity, given that investors possess the 
same information but interpret it in a different way. Analyst forecast dispersions (FD) and firm 
leverage (LE) proxy for the heterogeneity of opinion. In light of Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina 
(2002), the analyst forecast dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of earnings per share 
forecasts of multiple analysts. Agency problem implies that divergence of opinion and risk that 
investors perceive are larger in a firm with excessive debt. The firm leverage is defined as the 
ratio of book debt to total asset, where book debt is the sum of current liabilities and long-term 
debt. 
IPO characteristics could affect liquidity. The venture capital and underwriters in a 
syndicate presumably disseminate information of IPO securities. The greater the number of 
venture capital (VCD) and the number of underwriters (NMM) involved in an IPO syndicate are 
supposed to cause higher trading activity due to possibly  less information asymmetry in the 
secondary market.6 VCD is equal to one if a venture capital fund involves in an IPO and zero 
otherwise, and NMM is the number of underwriters in a syndicate, including lead manager, co-
managers, and members of the syndicate who are responsible for the distribution and sales of the 
                                                 
5 On the other hand, investors may perceive the volatility of past price performance as uncertainty about 
fundamental values, thereby leading to higher trading activity. 
6 One may contend that the involvement of venture capital or a larger number of underwriters enhances the visibility 
of an IPO stock, thereby improving aftermarket liquidity.  
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underwritten shares. The underwriters serve as a source of uninformed trading when they 
exercise overallotment option for the purpose of stabilizing IPO price. The ratio of shares 
exercised in overallotment option to total shares outstanding (ROS) should be positively 
associated with the IPO aftermarket liquidity over a price-stabilization period. Arguably, a larger 
indicative price range results in higher IPO aftermarket liquidity. This is because the indicative 
price range may reveal the pre-issuance estimation uncertainty with regard to intrinsic value (see 
Kandel, Sarig, and Wohl (1999), and Cornelli and Goldreich (2003)), or differences of opinion. 
Higher indicative offer price (IPR) is assumed to increase post-IPO trading activity. IPR is 
derived by subtracting low filing price from high filing price documented in an IPO prospectus.  
Both industry learning and structural break effects could influence the IPO aftermarket 
liquidity. The industry learning effects resulted from the spillovers of information production in a 
specific sector may trigger informed trading, as Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) 
suggested that investment banks implicitly bundle offerings to prevent failures in primary equity 
markets. To reflect the nature of industry learning effects, I proxy the number of IPOs in the 
same industry (NIH) for the industry learning effects on IPO liquidity. The more IPOs in the 
same industry is observed, the more likely it is to cause informed trading.  NIH is calculated as 
the number of IPOs with the same four-digit SIC code half year prior to IPO offer date. To check 
for the possible structural break effects of hot and cold IPO periods on IPO trading activity, I use 
hot IPO dummy (HID) to distinguish a hot IPO period from a cold IPO period.7 HID takes on the 
                                                 
7Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) examine the effects of information spillovers on IPO issues and 
use the number of filings in active registration on a firm’s offering date to proxy hot issue market. Lowry and 
Schwert (2002) show the fluctuation of IPO issues at the monthly frequency from 1960 to 2001 in Figure 1 and 
conclude that more positive information lead to more companies filing IPOs. Ritter and Welch (2002) indicate year-
by-year variations in the number of IPOs and aggrate gross proceeds from 1980 to 2001 in Table 1. 
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value of one if the number of IPOs in a year is greater than the average number of IPOs during 
the sample period and zero otherwise.  
Finally, I measure IPO trading activity in three aspects, namely, relative bid-ask spreads, 
share turnover, and price impact. Lo and Wang (2000) argue that share turnover is an appropriate 
measure of trading activity. I add relative bid-ask spreads8 to represent transaction costs 
instituted by market makers, and price impact that evaluates the impact of trading on prices, 
computed as the absolute price change relative to the amount of shares traded. The consideration 
of relative bid-ask spreads and price impact as dependent variables takes a step toward 
understanding IPO trading activity from different viewpoints. Relative bid-ask spreads (RAB) are 
defined as the difference of ask and bid price divided by the midpoint of ask and bid price. The 
share turnover (TURN) is the number of traded shares divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. The price impact (PI) is calculated as the absolute of price change divided by the 
number of traded shares. The next section explains the sample data and descriptive statistics.  
Data and Descriptive Statistics  
I identify U.S. IPOs listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from January 1995 to 
December 2005 from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database. The IPO sample 
excludes withdrawn IPOs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, and ADRs. I collect monthly 
data for each IPO stock one year following IPO issuance date, except for the first month. The 
data of the first month subsequent to IPO issuance date is not included because I use one-month 
lag of return as one of the explanatory variables. Moreover, the first month’s trading is affected 
                                                 
8 Roll (1984) suggests that effective bid-ask spread be measured by Cov−2 where Cov is the first-order serial 
covariance of price changes under the assumption of market efficiency.  
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by investment bank’s stabilization and the lack of analyst coverage, which implies that the first 
month’s trading is abnormal. In order to examine whether IPO liquidity behaves differently 
between the second and twelfth month after the issuance date, I split the entire IPO sample into 
two periods. The first period (interchangeably, period 1) represents the dataset during the period 
of the second month to sixth month, while the second period (interchangeably, the period 2) 
constitutes the dataset during the period of the seventh month to twelfth month. The sixth month 
cutoff point coincides with the typical expiration of lockup period. This is important because it 
means that the second period is more likely to reflect the activity of a “normal” firm.  
Three different measures of IPO liquidity come from Center for Research in Securities 
Price (CRSP), including relative bid-ask spreads, turnover, and price impact. CRSP also provides 
the data for past return (RET+ and RET−), volatility of present return (SDPR), firm size (LMV), 
and stock price (LSP). Using the book debt and shareholders’ equity in COMPUSTAT and 
equity value in CRSP, I obtain leverage (LE) and book-to-market ratio (BM). IBES database 
offers analyst forecast dispersion (FD) and relative absolute earnings surprises (RAES). The 
source of variables pertinent to IPO characteristics, such as IPR, ROS, NMM, VCD, NIH, and 
HID, is the Global New Issues Database of Securities Data Company (SDC). The original 
sample dataset consists of 20,652 firm-month observations. I exclude missing data mostly 
because FD and RAES are not available for many newly listed firms.9 The final entire IPO 
sample comprises12,152 firm-month observations, with the first and second periods containing 
4,978, and 7,174 firm-month observations, respectively.  
                                                 
9 Since IBES database yields earnings forecast on a quarterly basis, it is difficult to substitute either previous or 
subsequent values for missing earnings forecast within only one-year horizon. 
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Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for the three measures of liquidity and 
explanatory variables. At a first glance, the statistics for each of liquidity measures are quite 
similar for periods 1, and 2. Panel A indicates that newly listed firms tend to be growth stocks 
and equity-financed because the average of book-to market ratio and leverage are 0.41 and 0.39, 
respectively. Most of IPO stocks involve the sales of additional shares in the secondary market 
because the average ratio of shares exercised in overallotment option to total shares outstanding 
is 0.13, very close to 15 percent of which investment banks typically take a short position in a 
new issuance.  There appear to no huge difference between periods 1 and 2. Not reported in 
Table 1, the hot IPO period is found to be the horizon from year 1995 through 2000 because the 
number of IPOs in each year of this period is higher than the average number of IPOs from 1995 
to 2005. The cold period is found to be from year 2001 to 2005, consistent with the anecdotal 
collapse of internet bubble beginning in 2001. 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of explanatory variables. As expected, the series 
of the log of market value (LMV) and stock price (LSP) are positively correlated. Moreover, 
LMV is positively correlated with the number of underwriters (NMM) in a syndicate and the 
number of analysts (LANA), suggesting that larger IPO firms are related to more underwriters 
and security analysts. Because the explanatory variables are not strongly correlated, the bias 
owning to multicollinearity in the regression models should not be of major concern.10 I also 
address the possible endogeneity problems between trading activity and independent variables in 
Section 6. 
                                                 
10 A large sample size (12,152 firm-month observations) may mitigate multicollinearity problems and produce more 
precise parameter estimates with lower standard errors. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
This table summarizes descriptive statistics for the full period, containing the monthly data of IPO firms 
from 1995 to 2005. The relative bid-ask spread (RAB) is defined as the difference of ask and bid price 
divided by the midpoint of ask and bid price. The turnover (TURN) is defined the number of traded shares 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The price impact (PI: dollars in 1000 shares) is 
measured as the absolute of price change divided by 1000 traded shares. The past returns, RET+ and 
RET−, are the positive and negative return at a month lag, respectively, and zero otherwise. SDPR is 
volatility of present daily return in each month. The stock price and firm size are computed as the log of 
price (LSP) and equity value (LMV), respectively. The book-to-market ratio (BM) is estimated as the 
shareholders’ equity divided by the market value of equity. LANA is defined as the log of one plus the 
number of analysts following IPO stocks. Forecast dispersion (FD) is the standard deviation of quarterly 
analyst earnings forecast reported in dollars per share in the IBES database. Leverage (LE) is the book 
debt divided by market equity value. RAES is calculated as the earnings surprise (actual earnings minus 
forecast earnings) divided by forecast earnings. IPR is derived by subtracting low filing price from high 
filing price documented in an IPO prospectus. ROS is the ratio of shares exercised in overallotment option 
to total shares outstanding. NMM is the number of underwriters in a syndicate and VCD is equal to one if 
a venture capital fund involves in an IPO firm and zero otherwise. NIH is calculated as the number of 
IPOs with the same four-digit SIC code half year prior to IPO offer date. Hot IPO dummy (HID) takes on 
one if the number of IPOs in a year is greater than the average number of IPOs during the sample period 
and zero otherwise. 
Panel A    Full period   
Category  Mean Median STD Skewness Kurtosis 
 RAB 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.91 6.48 
Liquidity TURN 0.16 0.10 0.23 7.59 127.80 
 PI 0.02 0.01 0.06 10.56 185.95 
Price RET+ 0.09 0.01 0.16 3.02 14.50 
performance RET− -0.08 0.00 0.15 -3.10 13.90 
 SDPR 0.21 0.17 0.13 2.32 19.39 
Stock LMV 5.87 5.82 1.20 0.40 0.28 
visibility LSP 2.74 2.80 0.72 -0.41 0.79 
 BM 0.41 0.29 0.53 9.73 196.40 
Informed LANA 1.49 1.39 0.37 0.94 0.57 
Dispersion FD 0.03 0.01 0.25 36.07 1,560.26 
of opinion LE 0.39 0.30 0.31 4.89 93.03 
Uncertainty RAES 0.60 0.21 1.59 9.64 136.69 
 IPR 2.01 2.00 0.61 4.07 62.65 
Pre-IPO ROS 0.13 0.15 0.03 -2.07 3.84 
uncertainty NMM 3.54 3.00 1.80 3.86 27.37 
 VCD 0.55 1.00 0.50 -0.21 -1.96 
IPO NIH 8.28 3.00 13.35 2.30 4.60 
cycle HID 0.71 1.00 0.45 -0.94 -1.12 
Observations (firm-month) = 12,152 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
This table summarizes monthly descriptive statistics for the period 1, which represents the dataset during 
the period of the second month to sixth month after the issuance date. 
Panel B    Period 1   
Category  Mean Median STD Skewness Kurtosis 
 RAB 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.70 4.71 
Liquidity TURN 0.15 0.10 0.22 6.69 76.83 
 PI 0.02 0.01 0.05 8.03 105.05 
Price RET+ 0.11 0.02 0.18 2.82 11.07 
performance RET− -0.08 0.00 0.15 -3.35 17.18 
 SDPR 0.22 0.18 0.14 1.71 5.29 
Stock LMV 5.95 5.90 1.17 0.43 0.25 
visibility LSP 2.82 2.84 0.67 -0.17 0.88 
 BM 0.36 0.25 0.47 9.70 211.99 
Informed LANA 1.41 1.39 0.32 1.10 1.23 
Dispersion FD 0.02 0.01 0.13 34.20 1,378.72 
of opinion LE 0.39 0.28 0.35 7.20 133.19 
Uncertainty RAES 0.60 0.23 1.48 9.22 126.30 
 IPR 2.02 2.00 0.60 4.48 66.78 
Pre-IPO ROS 0.13 0.15 0.03 -2.05 3.76 
uncertainty NMM 3.59 3.00 1.77 3.70 24.39 
 VCD 0.57 1.00 0.50 -0.28 -1.92 
IPO NIH 8.49 3.00 13.78 2.28 4.41 
cycle HID 0.75 1.00 0.43 -1.13 -0.71 
Observations (firm-month) =4,978 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
This table summarizes monthly descriptive statistics for the period 2, which represents the dataset during 
the period of the seventh to twelfth month after the issuance date. 
Panel C    Period 2   
Category  Mean Median STD Skewness Kurtosis 
 RAB 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.95 6.69 
Liquidity TURN 0.17 0.11 0.24 8.06 151.35 
 PI 0.02 0.01 0.07 10.52 174.47 
Price RET+ 0.09 0.01 0.15 3.13 17.93 
performance RET− -0.08 0.00 0.14 -2.93 11.58 
 SDPR 0.20 0.17 0.13 2.80 31.47 
Stock LMV 5.82 5.77 1.22 0.39 0.30 
visibility LSP 2.69 2.77 0.74 -0.50 0.61 
 BM 0.45 0.32 0.57 9.68 186.04 
Informed LANA 1.55 1.39 0.40 0.78 0.14 
Dispersion FD 0.03 0.01 0.31 31.14 1,126.26 
of opinion LE 0.39 0.31 0.28 1.35 5.40 
Uncertainty RAES 0.60 0.20 1.66 9.80 139.10 
 IPR 2.00 2.00 0.62 3.82 60.08 
Pre-IPO ROS 0.13 0.15 0.03 -2.08 3.90 
uncertainty NMM 3.50 3.00 1.82 3.97 29.30 
 VCD 0.54 1.00 0.50 -0.15 -1.98 
IPO NIH 8.13 3.00 13.05 2.31 4.71 
cycle HID 0.69 1.00 0.46 -0.82 -1.34 
Observations (firm-month) =7,174 
 
Table 2  
Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlation matrix of explanatory variables for the full period that contains the monthly data of IPO firms from 
1995 to 2005. The asterisk highlights correlation coefficients if greater than 0.3 or less than -0.3. The total number of firm-month 
observations is 12,152. 
 RET+ RET− SDPR LMV LSP BM LANA FD LE RAES IPR ROS NMM VCD NIH HID 
RET+ 1                
RET− 0.32* 1               
SDPR 0.12 -0.37* 1              
LMV 0.14 0.10 -0.02 1             
LSP 0.18 0.19 -0.08 0.66* 1            
BM -0.13 -0.06 -0.08 -0.22 -0.21 1           
LANA 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.52* 0.27 0.00 1          
FD -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.00 1         
LE -0.08 0.13 -0.28 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 1        
RAES 0.00 -0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 1       
IPR -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.22 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.01 1      
ROS -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 0.03 -0.14 -0.07 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.08 1     
NMM -0.05 0.05 -0.16 0.49* 0.19 0.18 0.47* 0.02 0.23 -0.02 0.14 -0.12 1    
VCD 0.07 -0.10 0.23 0.08 -0.02 -0.16 0.10 0.02 -0.20 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.00 1   
NIH 0.12 -0.14 0.34* 0.03 0.03 -0.11 -0.03 -0.01 -0.25 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.20 1  
HID 0.08 -0.08 0.23 -0.18 0.02 -0.09 -0.28 0.01 -0.12 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.42* -0.15 0.22 1 
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Table 2  
Correlation Matrix (continued)  
This table presents the correlation matrix of explanatory variables for the first period that contains the monthly data of IPO firms 
from 1995 to 2005. The asterisk highlights correlation coefficients if greater than 0.3 or less than -0.3. The total number of firm-month 
observations is 4,978. 
 RET+ RET− SDPR LMV LSP BM LANA FD LE RAES IPR ROS NMM VCD NIH HID 
RET+ 1                
RET− 0.31* 1               
SDPR 0.16 -0.36* 1              
LMV 0.19 0.09 0.06 1             
LSP 0.27 0.17 0.05 0.64* 1            
BM -0.15 -0.04 -0.15 -0.19 -0.15 1           
LANA -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.49* 0.24 0.04 1          
FD -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 1         
LE -0.10 0.12 -0.29 0.07 -0.06 0.03 0.10 0.01 1        
RAES 0.00 -0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 1       
IPR -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.24 0.08 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.01 1      
ROS -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09 0.04 -0.14 -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.03 -0.08 1     
NMM -0.05 0.05 -0.16 0.5* 0.19 0.21 0.56* 0.04 0.21 -0.02 0.17 -0.12 1    
VCD 0.09 -0.09 0.24 0.11 0.06 -0.22 0.04 0.04 -0.19 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 1   
NIH 0.16 -0.13 0.35* 0.08 0.14 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 -0.22 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.20 1  
HID 0.13 -0.10 0.30 -0.18 -0.01 -0.10 -0.34* -0.01 -0.14 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.42* -0.12 0.26 1 
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Table 2  
Correlation Matrix (continued)  
This table presents the correlation matrix of explanatory variables for the second period that contains the monthly data of IPO firms 
from 1995 to 2005. The asterisk highlights correlation coefficients if greater than 0.3 or less than -0.3. The total number of firm-month 
observations is7,174. 
 RET+ RET− SDPR LMV LSP BM LANA FD LE RAES IPR ROS NMM VCD NIH HID 
RET+ 1                
RET− 0.32* 1               
SDPR 0.08 -0.37* 1              
LMV 0.10 0.11 -0.08 1             
LSP 0.11 0.20 -0.18 0.66* 1            
BM -0.11 -0.07 -0.03 -0.24 -0.23 1           
LANA 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.57* 0.32* -0.04 1          
FD -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 1         
LE -0.05 0.14 -0.29 0.15 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.02 1        
RAES -0.01 -0.06 0.08 -0.05 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 1       
IPR 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.21 0.08 -0.01 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.02 1      
ROS -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.14 -0.06 0.02 -0.13 0.02 -0.08 1     
NMM -0.05 0.06 -0.16 0.48* 0.19 0.17 0.45* 0.01 0.25 -0.02 0.13 -0.12 1    
VCD 0.05 -0.10 0.22 0.05 -0.07 -0.13 0.14 0.02 -0.22 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.01 1   
NIH 0.09 -0.15 0.33* -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.28 0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.10 0.20 1  
HID 0.04 -0.06 0.18 -0.18 0.03 -0.07 -0.24 0.02 -0.10 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.42* -0.18 0.19 1 
Panel Regression Results 
The method involves a random effects model as follows: 
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where Yi,t denotes each of the three liquidity variables (RABi,t, TURNi,t and PIi,t) for IPO stock i in 
month t. 11  The unobservable effect, ai, is assumed to be uncorrelated with each explanatory 
variable.12 The error ui,t is the idiosyncratic or time-varying error.  
Table 3 displays the regression results for each model specification, with Panels A, B, 
and C each uses a different measure of liquidity. For the ease of tracking, I discuss the results by 
variable category, beginning with firm visibility in this paragraph. Panel A uses the bid-ask 
spread as the liquidity measure. It indicates that stock visibility plays a role in explaining trading 
activity in the form of transaction costs, because the candidate measures of stock visibility, LMV 
and LSP are consistently negative and statistically significant at 1% level for periods 1 and 2, as 
well as the entire period. The negative effect of market value and price on transaction costs is 
consistent with Brennan and Hughes (1991) who suggested an inverse relation between 
brokerage commission and price level. The impact of book-to-market ratio is not as evident as 
LMV and LSP because BM is not significant in the first period. Panel B, in which the liquidity is 
measured by share turnover, shows that high price stocks as proxied by LSP attract more 
individual trading, consistent with the argument of Merton (1987).  
                                                 
11 In order to have good properties in random effects estimation, the number of cross-sectional IPO sample firms is 
1,497 and relatively larger than the number of time periods, 11 months. 
12 IPO firms may have unobservable effects on liquidity that are not correlated with independent variables because 
of volatile trading activity in the IPO aftermarket.  
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Table 3  
Results of Random Effects Models 
Table 3 summarizes the results of random effect estimations. I regress relative bid-ask (RAB), 
share turnover (TURN), and price impact (PI) on explanatory variables in Panel A, B, and C, 
respectively. For expositional convenience, I use subscript t to indicate the time period in the 
panel regression at the monthly frequency and omit the subscript of cross-sectional IPO firms, i. 
The signs ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A   RABt  
Category Independent variable Full period Period 1 Period 2 
 Constant 0.0578*** 0.0524*** 0.0621*** 
Price RET+t-1 0.0004 0.0008* -0.0002 
performance RET− t-1 -0.0014*** -0.0021*** -0.001 
 SDPR t 0.0117*** 0.0069*** 0.0101*** 
Stock LMV t -0.0051*** -0.0042*** -0.0059*** 
visibility LSPt -0.0048*** -0.0054*** -0.0052*** 
 BMt 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0002** 
Informed LANAt -0.0019*** -0.0002 -0.0019*** 
Dispersion FDt -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004 
of opinion LEt 0.0007 0.0005 0.002* 
Uncertainty RAESt 0.000 0.0001 0.000 
 IPRt 0.0018*** 0.0017*** 0.0022*** 
Pre-IPO 
uncertainty ROSt -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0011 
 NMMt -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0004* 
 VCDt -0.0027*** -0.0024*** -0.0029*** 
IPO NIHt 0.0000 0.000 0.000* 
cycle HIDt 0.0061*** 0.007*** 0.0066*** 
 Adj. R2 0.4695 0.4754 0.4782 
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Table 3  
Results of Random Effects Models (continued)  
 
Panel B   TURNt  
Category Independent variable Full period Period 1 Period 2 
 Constant -0.0223 0.0788** -0.1432*** 
Price RET+t-1 0.0214** 0.0428*** 0.0103 
performance RET− t-1 0.0108 0.0177 0.0024 
 SDPR t 0.7102*** 0.5237*** 0.878*** 
Stock LMV t -0.0676*** -0.0796*** -0.0522*** 
visibility LSPt 0.1305*** 0.1402*** 0.1505*** 
 BMt 0.0007 0.0003 0.0008 
Informed LANAt 0.0752*** 0.0033 0.038*** 
Dispersion FDt 0.0119 0.0065 0.0112 
of opinion LEt -0.0014 0.0075 -0.0215 
Uncertainty RAESt -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.001 
 IPRt -0.011* -0.0125 -0.0138** 
Pre-IPO 
uncertainty ROSt 0.0289 -0.0618 0.0802 
 NMMt 0.0086*** 0.0235*** 0.008*** 
 VCDt -0.0012 -0.0091 0.0174** 
IPO NIHt 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 
cycle HIDt -0.0659*** -0.027*** -0.0469*** 
 Adj. R2 0.2630 0.2315 0.3191 
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Table 3  
Results of Random Effects Models (continued) 
  
Panel C   PIt  
Category Independent variable Full period Period 1 Period 2 
 Constant 0.0685*** 0.0464*** 0.0839*** 
Price RET+t-1 -0.0051* -0.0017 -0.0069 
performance RET− t-1 0.0099*** 0.0066 0.0118** 
 SDPR t 0.011** -0.0004 0.0118* 
Stock LMV t -0.0167*** -0.0142*** -0.0185*** 
visibility LSPt 0.0198*** 0.0164*** 0.0201*** 
 BMt -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
Informed LANAt -0.0038** -0.0005 -0.0068** 
Dispersion FDt -0.0022 -0.0029 -0.0026 
of opinion LEt 0.0098*** 0.0066*** 0.0123** 
Uncertainty RAESt -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 IPRt 0.0027 0.0029* 0.0033 
Pre-IPO 
uncertainty ROSt 0.0182 0.0656** 0.0029 
 NMMt -0.002*** -0.0017** -0.0016 
 VCDt -0.0092*** -0.0045** -0.0122*** 
IPO NIHt -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0003*** 
cycle HIDt 0.0076*** 0.0098*** 0.0087*** 
 Adj. R2 0.1108 0.1294 0.1121 
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Note that the coefficients of LSP are opposite in Panels A and B—the implication is that 
higher stock price attracts more trading and lower transaction costs. Also note that the point 
estimates of LSP are twice as large as those of LMV, the level of stock price seems to be a more 
important factor on turnover than firm size. Likewise, Panel C shows that both LMV and LSP are 
related to price impact at 1% level. In general, I find strong evidence that proxies of stock 
visibility, LMV and LSP, affect trading activity in IPO aftermarket. 
Among the variables of past price performance, the coefficient estimates of price 
volatility (SDPR) are positive and significant at 1% level in Panel A, suggesting that market 
makers increase bid-ask spreads to compensate the inventory costs and/or risk resulted from 
price fluctuation. The findings of SDPR are in agreement with previous microstructure studies 
such as Stoll and Whaley (1990) that found that the price volatility increases the costs of 
providing immediacy. Compared to other independent variables in Panel B, SDPR is not only 
statistically significant but also has a large effect across the three periods. For instance, the 
estimate of SDPR, 0.71, is higher than other explanatory variables in the full period of Panel B. 
This result arises possibly because the volatility of past return contributes to the portfolio 
rebalancing needs and thus turnover, reflecting the view of Gomes (2005) who suggested a 
positive correlation between trading volume and stock return volatility. On the other hand, the 
empirical findings of RET+ and RET− are not as robust as those of SDPR because both 
coefficient estimates appear to be only marginally significant. Note, however, past returns are 
statistically significant in explaining spreads and turnover in Period 1 not Period 2. This result 
suggests that the initial period (Period 1) is driven more by momentum, compared to period 2. 
The difference in the two periods also means that separate analyses of initial period and later 
period can provide additional insights.  Overall, stock visibility as measured by LMV and LSP 
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and past return as measured by SDPR are consistent with the theoretical prediction regarding the 
role of liquidity trading. 
The parameters associated with analyst coverage largely lend support for the arguments 
for the importance of informed agents. Panel A shows that he coefficients of analyst coverage 
(LANA) are negative at 1% level in both the entire period and period 2. The negative effect of 
LANA on trading costs implies that analyst following facilitates information and increases IPO 
liquidity in the secondary market. Similarly, LANA contributes to share turnover in Panel B as 
well as price impact in Panel C. The more analysts following an IPO stock, the higher is the 
turnover and less price impact in the aftermarket trading.  
Empirical evidence hardly indicates the importance of both differences of opinion and 
estimation uncertainty about an IPO firm. Except for the leverage ratio in Panel C of Table 3, the 
coefficient estimates of analyst forecast dispersion (FD) and leverage (LE) exhibit little 
explanatory power on IPO trading activity. The insignificance of RAES, a proxy for estimation 
uncertainty about intrinsic value, indicates that earnings surprises for newly listed firms have no 
impact on trading activity as measured by RAB, TURN, and PI. One possible explanation is that 
investors are less likely to rely on earnings forecasts for IPO stocks than those for seasoned 
stocks because IPO firms tend to be young, tech-oriented, and equity-financed companies 
characterized by volatile cash flow, relative to their counterparts.   
Estimation of the spectrum of parameters associated with IPO characteristics supports the 
relationship of post-IPO trading activity with IPO attributes. Most notable is that most of 
coefficient estimates of NMM are significant for the three dimensions of trading activity at the 
1% level. Panel A shows the regression of relative bid-ask price on explanatory variables. The 
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results suggest that the higher the number of underwriters in a syndicate (NMM), the lower the 
costs of turning around a position. Corresponding to the results in Panel A are those in Panel C 
based on the measurement of price impact.  One additional underwriter decreases on average the 
absolute price change by two dollars in 1000 shares in the full period.  Also in Panel B, NMM is 
positively linked to share turnover, suggesting that the lead manager, co-managers, and members 
of a syndicate stimulate IPO trading activity. The positive effects of underwriters on trading 
activity confirm the theories based on information asymmetry and/or stock visibility; that is, 
underwriters facilitate the resolution of information asymmetry and publicize IPO stocks, 
stimulating liquidity in the secondary market. 
Furthermore, Table 3 shows that hot IPO dummy (HID) is statistically positive in Panels 
A and C, but negative in Panel B at 1% level. Those results are consistent with a structural break 
on IPO trading activity and suggest that IPO firms experience higher trading costs and price 
impact per share, but lower turnover from 1995 to 2000.  I surmise that the shortage of supply of 
shares during a hot IPO period suppresses the liquidity in the IPO aftermarket. This explanation 
could be consistent with the findings of Ritter and Welch (2002) that share allocation issues and 
agency conflict matter in IPOs. . 
Venture capitalists also exert an impact on post-IPO trading activity. Panel B reveals that 
IPO firms backed by venture capital are expected to increase turnover by 1.74% at 5% 
significance level, but only in period 2, namely, 6 months after the offerings. The finding is 
consistent with Brav and Gompers (2003) and Field and Hanka (2001) who documented the 
venture capitalist sales of IPO shares after the expiration of a lock-up period (typically 180 
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days).13 The presence of venture capital funding (VCD) substantially reduces the relative bid-ask 
spreads and price impact in Panels A and C, respectively. Interestingly, the magnitudes of VCD 
coefficients are at least twice as large as those of NMM, suggesting that venture capital plays an 
essential role in reducing the information asymmetry and/or enhancing the visibility of IPOs.  
The triviality of an overallotment option (ROS) indicates that an overallotment option 
typically exercised within the 30 days after IPO issuance date exhibits no persistent influence on 
RAB, TURN, and PI. This result justifies the hypothesis that an overallotment option plays no 
role in explaining IPO trading activity after the price-stabilization period. Panels A and B show 
that the coefficient estimates of the number of IPOs in the same industry (NIH) are statistically 
insignificant. This finding rejects the role of industry learning effects in reducing the relative bid-
ask spreads and increasing turnover. Panel A shows that the coefficients of indicative price range 
(IPR) are consistently positive at 1% level. Intuitively, market makers who deal with greater 
estimation uncertainty about an IPO stock command higher trading premium. However, Panels B 
and C indicate that IPR is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the relationship between 
estimation uncertainty and IPO trading activity is ambiguous.  
In short, the results of random effects model largely support theories that post-IPO 
trading activity depends on stock visibility, past return, informed agents, and certain IPO 
characteristics. The differences of opinion and estimation uncertainty about an IPO stock 
generate little IPO aftermarket liquidity. Nonetheless, one caveat inherent in the regression 
model is the contemporary causality between IPO trading activity and the spectrum of 
explanatory variables.  I address the possible endogenous problems in the next section.  
                                                 
13 In particular, the empirical results of Brav and Gompers (2003) support the commitment hypothesis that IPO firms 
backed by venture capitalists are more likely to be released from the limitation of a lock-up period. 
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Endogeneity and Robustness Check 
The specification of Equation (1) assumes the explanatory variables are exogenous, but 
this may not be true. For instance, one may contend that a security analyst is attracted to IPO 
stocks with higher trading volume and that an overallotment option is likely to be exercised in 
IPO stocks with more seller-initiated trades. As a consequence, the opposite causality may 
produce biased coefficient estimates in Equation (1). To address this issue, I substitute lagged 
variables for contemporaneous variables and run predictive regressions of trading activity on a 
broad set of one-month lagged explanatory variables. The specification of the random effects 
model is the following: 
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where the subscript  t−1 denotes the lag of a month; except for this time difference, the variables 
are as defined as those in Equation (1). 
Table 4 presents the regression results from Equation (2). Stock visibility proxied by 
LMV and LSP calculated as of the preceding month explains the three trading measurements at 
1% level. Furthermore, the findings are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3.  
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Table 4  
Regression Results of Lagged Explanatory Variables 
To address the possible heterogeneous problems, I regress contemporaneous trading activity on a 
broad set of one-month lagged explanatory variables. Table 4 summarizes the regression results 
of relative bid-ask (RAB), share turnover (TURN), and price impact (PI) in Panel A, B, and C, 
respectively. For expositional convenience, I use subscript t to indicate the time period at the 
monthly frequency and ignore the subscript of cross-sectional IPO firms, i. The signs ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A   RABt  
Category Independent Variable Full period Period 1 Period 2 
 Constant 0.0504*** 0.0491*** 0.0532*** 
Price RET+t-1 -0.0047*** -0.0027*** -0.0053*** 
performance RET− t-1 -0.0057*** -0.0061*** -0.0052*** 
 SDPR t-1 0.0076*** 0.0043*** 0.0054*** 
Stock LMV t-1 -0.0048*** -0.0045*** -0.0055*** 
visibility LSPt-1 -0.0028*** -0.0031*** -0.0029*** 
 BMt-1 0.0019*** -0.0005 0.0013*** 
Informed LANAt-1 -0.0013*** 0.0003 -0.0013*** 
Dispersion FDt-1 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 
of opinion LEt-1 0.0015*** 0.0006 0.0028*** 
Uncertainty RAESt-1 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0000 
 IPRt-1 0.0021*** 0.0012** 0.0026*** 
Pre-IPO 
uncertainty ROSt-1 -0.0016 -0.0094 -0.0034 
 NMMt-1 -0.0010*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 
 VCDt-1 -0.0027*** -0.0024*** -0.0027*** 
IPO NIHt-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
cycle HIDt-1 0.0063*** 0.0078*** 0.0070*** 
 Adj. R2 0.4597 0.4654 0.4704 
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Table 4  
Regression Results of Lagged Explanatory Variables (continued) 
 
Panel B   TURNt  
Category Independent variable Full period Period 1 Period 2 
 Constant 0.0264 0.1048*** -0.0308 
Price RET+t-1 0.0159 0.0092 0.0185 
performance RET− t-1 -0.0579*** -0.0315** -0.0674*** 
 SDPR t-1 0.1031*** 0.0785*** 0.1084*** 
Stock LMV t-1 -0.0485*** -0.0615*** -0.0354*** 
visibility LSPt-1 0.1118*** 0.1285*** 0.117*** 
 BMt-1 0.0185*** 0.0141 0.0259*** 
Informed LANAt-1 0.0766*** 0.0101 0.0555*** 
Dispersion FDt-1 0.0078 -0.0089 0.0069 
of opinion LEt-1 -0.0287*** -0.0283*** -0.0683*** 
Uncertainty RAESt-1 0.0024** 0.0010 0.0033** 
 IPRt-1 -0.0185*** -0.0201*** -0.0205*** 
Pre-IPO 
uncertainty ROSt-1 -0.0109 -0.0998 0.0321 
 NMMt-1 0.0023 0.0162*** 0.0011 
 VCDt-1 0.0300*** 0.0146 0.0459*** 
IPO NIHt-1 0.0012*** 0.0008** 0.0010*** 
cycle HIDt-1 -0.0283*** -0.0055 -0.0118 
 Adj. R2 0.1537 0.1596 0.1660 
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Table 4  
Regression Results of Lagged Explanatory Variables (continued) 
 
Panel C   PIt  
Category Independent variable Full period Period 1 Period 2 
 Constant 0.0765*** 0.0594*** 0.0846*** 
Price RET+t-1 -0.0041 -0.0009 -0.0066 
performance RET− t-1 0.0096*** 0.0094* 0.0097* 
 SDPR t-1 -0.0003 -0.0047 -0.0019 
Stock LMV t-1 -0.0178*** -0.0158*** -0.0187*** 
visibility LSPt-1 0.0205*** 0.0177*** 0.0195*** 
 BMt-1 -0.0031 -0.0035 -0.0036 
Informed LANAt-1 -0.0037* -0.0017 -0.0043 
Dispersion FDt-1 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0018 
of opinion LEt-1 0.0103*** 0.0067** 0.0136*** 
Uncertainty RAESt-1 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0002 
 IPRt-1 0.0029 0.0034* 0.0031 
Pre-IPO 
uncertainty ROSt-1 0.0260 0.0506 0.0143 
 NMMt-1 -0.0021** -0.0017** -0.0017* 
 VCDt-1 -0.0116*** -0.0074*** -0.0124*** 
IPO NIHt-1 -0.0002** 0.0000 -0.0003** 
cycle HIDt-1 0.0080*** 0.0101*** 0.0092*** 
 Adj. R2 0.1153 0.1354 0.1142 
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Panel A of Table 4 indicates that all variables of past return are significantly related to 
relative bid-ask spreads at 1% level. Surprisingly, RET+ and RET− become statistically and 
economically significant at 1% level, relative to their counterparts in Table 3. Note that 
magnitude of RET+ and RET− are larger than most of other explanatory variables, the 
importance of RET+ and RET− is in line with the arguments of Ellis, Michaely, and 
O’Hara(2000) who found that market making activity of underwriters is a stand-alone profit 
center in the IPO aftermarket trading. Given the substantial variation and impacts of IPO returns 
on secondary market liquidity, underwriters are more likely to generate trading profits from a 
volatile and liquid IPO market, other things being equal. 
The fact that RET+ is not significant and RET− is significantly negative at 1% level in 
Panel B seems to contradict the disposition effect, as Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Odean 
(1998) asserted that loss-averse investors are more likely to sell winner and keep loser; it is 
consistent with liquidity constraints (e.g., short-selling constraints) being more important in 
down markets. Consistent with Table 3, SDPR is significantly positive at 1% level and thus 
contributes to share turnover. In general, the regression results largely maintain the relationship 
of liquidity (or noise) trading with IPO trading activity. 
Compatible with the results in Table 3, the effects of analysts following (LANA) on RAB 
and TURN are negative and positive, respectively, at 1% level in both the entire period and 
period 2, suggesting that the mass of informed agents helps to increase IPO liquidity in the 
following month. The heterogeneity of opinion as proxied by leverage (LE) becomes significant 
at 1% level in predicting IPO trading activity, whereas forecast dispersion (FD) remains 
insignificant. Nonetheless, the negative effects of LE on share turnover work in the opposite way 
as predicted by theoretical model of dispersion of opinion. Compared to other candidate 
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variables, the coefficient estimates of relative earnings surprises (RAES) show a marginal impact 
(i.e., 0.0024 at 5% significance level in the entire period) on TURN in Panel B. The 
insignificance of RAES in Panels A and C also suggest a minor role of estimation uncertainty in 
predicting IPO aftermarket liquidity measured by RAB and PI, respectively. In brief, Table 4 
confirms the findings in Table 3 that little empirical evidence supports the importance of 
differences of opinion and estimation uncertainty on IPO liquidity. 
Turning to the results of IPO characteristics, Table 4 shows that coefficients of NMM and 
HID are strongly related to IPO trading activity. The negative impacts of the number of 
underwriters (NMM) on bid-ask spreads and price impact are compatible with the view of 
information asymmetry because a syndicate takes on the responsibility of market making and 
thus information production for a new issue. On the other hand, HID is positively associated with 
bid-ask spreads and price impact and is negatively related to share turnover. The fact that the 
presence of HID decreases IPO aftermarket liquidity suggests lower liquidity for newly listed 
firms during a hot IPO period, relative to a cold IPO period.  
The presence of venture capitalists (VCD) adds to IPO liquidity in all three dimensions of 
trading activity. Nevertheless, venture capital increases share turnover only in period 2, not in the 
period 1. This finding may be partially explained by insider and venture capitalist-initiated orders 
following a lock-up period, as Brav and Gompers (2003) and Field and Hanka (2001) reported. 
Table 4 shows that the ratio of shares exercised in an overallotment option to total shares 
outstanding (ROS) is not significant and thus plays no essential role in forecasting IPO liquidity 
after the stabilization activity.     
 33
The empirical evidence of NIH and IPR are mixed. One the one hand, the number of 
IPOs in the same industry is related to higher turnover and lower price impact and the indicative 
price range is associated with lower transaction costs and turnover. On the other hand, the 
coefficients of NIH and IPR appear to be statistically insignificant in predicting RAB and PI, 
respectively. It is difficult to infer any unambiguous conclusion about the effects of NIH and IPR 
on IPO trading activity. 
To sum up, the results are largely robust in that the results are similar to those using 
contemporaneous explanatory variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions  
This paper examines the cross-sectional variations in liquidity for a sample of IPO firms 
from 1995 to 2005. Most of related literature focuses on the trading activity for seasoned stocks 
or short-term liquidity for IPO firms by using one liquidity measure. My study draws on the 
literature of trading activity and IPOs to analyze the determinants of IPO liquidity and sheds 
light on IPO trading activity from three perspectives of liquidity measures. I find that IPO 
liquidity is affected by the degree of past price performance, the extent of stock visibility, the 
mass of informed agents, and certain IPO characteristics.  
The results are of interest for practitioners and academia. IPO stocks exhibits different 
trading behaviors from seasoned stocks. A private firm that plans to undertake an IPO arguably 
should consider the liquidity effect, because an illiquid market could raise the costs of capital. 
Market makers that earn revenues from bid-ask spreads take into account the effects of stock 
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visibility and past price performance on IPO aftermarket trading. From a theoretical viewpoint, 
my finding that divergence of opinion and estimation uncertainty having little explanatory power 
for trading activity of IPO stocks is worthy of future research.   
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Chapter 2: Does Overreaction Tend To Occur After Persistent Information in 
the Options Markets? 
Introduction 
The possible existence of investor overreaction to new information shock is an important 
issue for financial economists. This paper attempts to examine whether growth and value option 
investors react differently to periods in which persistent information occurs. By “persistent”, I 
mean information that is similar in nature during a time period. Fro example, observing three 
consecutive price increases is interpreted as persistent information. In particular, I examine 
whether the degree of misreaction conditional on a pattern of previous information differs, if any, 
between growth and value investors in the options markets. 
Stein (1989), Poteshman (2001), and Cao, Li, and Yu (2005) examine whether options 
traders overreact to information, but they do not examine the dynamic changes in the extent of 
overreaction.14 It is possible that the extent of overreaction, if any, may vary over time and 
across different type of investors. This study exploits this possibility. I also find that reactions 
tend to be stronger for small stock’s options than for large stock’s options, consistent with the 
notion that the degree of information asymmetry is relatively greater for smaller stocks. The 
findings that the classification of investor style and the extent of prior overreaction affect 
subsequent overreaction perhaps motivate further theoretical development. 
This study extends the evidence of multiple-day increasing overreaction as Poteshman 
(2001) discovers in the S&P 100 index options market by analyzing growth and value stock 
options separately and by examining both large and small stock index options. As Stein (1989) 
                                                 
14 Stein (1989) argues that long-term S&P 100 option investors, on average, overreact to new 
information, compared to short-term S&P 100 option investors.  
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argues, testing for overreaction in the options market is less problematic than the stock market, 
since time-varying risk premium complicates the empirical testing on the stock market, while 
option value does not depend on risk premium. The implied volatility is the only salient 
stochastic variable in the option pricing model.  
More specifically, I examine the extent of misreaction, separately for growth and value 
investors to a period of mostly similar information entering the options market. The growth 
portfolio is proxied by NASDAQ 100 index and Russell 2000 growth index while value portfolio 
is proxied by Russell 2000 value index. Heynen et al. (1994) estimate the degree of 
misprojection of long-term investors relative to short-term investors in the options market. The 
degree of overreaction is defined as the difference of actual and expected implied volatility 
dependent on stochastic volatility process, namely mean-reverting, Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH), and Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model. I 
employ the prior multiple-day overreaction as a proxy for the arrival of information shock to the 
options investors.   
Some papers suggest that value stocks are undervalued (see Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1994) and La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997)). To the extent that this is 
true, value investors are likely to react strongly, after observing consecutive positive information. 
As a result, I expect that value investors who are subject to representative heuristic and 
conditional on consecutive similar information will react more strongly, compared to growth 
investors.  
In my empirical analysis, long-term implied volatility is regressed on short-term implied 
volatility, stock price volatility, three-day expiration dummy on short-term options contracts, and 
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a series of previous overreactions. The responsiveness of long-run option investors is measured 
by the coefficient on previous overreaction. The regression results indicate positive correlation 
between contemporaneous long-term implied volatility and the level of estimated overreaction in 
the prior period for value stocks. The correlation is negative for growth stocks. Therefore, the 
empirical evidence largely supports my prediction of both hypotheses above. I analyze which 
type of investors respond more strongly to a series of positive information. I find that value 
investors react more strongly to the magnitude of prior overreaction than growth investors. In 
addition to AR1 process, I examine whether the misreaction between growth and value investors 
is present under alternative specifications including GARCH and EGARCH models. The three 
models produce qualitatively similar results, suggesting that measurement problems are not 
large.  
The reminder of this study is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 details hypotheses. Section 4 describes methodology and data. I present the 
regression results and address the robustness in Section 5. The last section concludes.  
 
Literature Review 
I summarize the literature on overreaction in the stock and options markets and then 
review the literature on investor styles. 
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Overreaction in the Stock Market 
Related literature on overreaction based on stock market provides mixed evidence. Using 
CRSP monthly return data, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find that investors tend to overreact to 
unexpected news events. One school of thoughts attributes overreaction to momentum trading, 
representative heuristic, overconfidence or biased self-attribution. Hong and Stein (1999) assume 
information asymmetry between two types of rational investors, including newswatchers and 
momentum traders. They theorize that stock prices underreact in the short run because of gradual 
informational diffusion across traders. Short-run underreaction creates arbitrage opportunities for 
momentum traders. However, the attempt of momentum traders to arbitrage leads to overreaction 
of the stocks at long horizons.   
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Ritter (2003) relate representativeness bias to 
overreaction in the financial market. Representativeness bias is defined as underweighing long-
term average, and overemphasizing on recent information. After viewing a series of similar 
information shocks, investors subject to representativeness bias put too much weight on such 
information shocks, and ignore long-run fundamental valuation. As a result, stock price is 
overvalued and driven above equilibrium price in case of positive information series, and vice 
versa. On the other hand, Fama (1998) argues that market efficiency hypothesis is still held, 
because most long-term return anomalies might disappear when we take the methodology 
problem into account. He contends that overreaction to new information occurs as frequently as 
underreaction. 
Similar to Barberis et al. (1998) and Ritter (2003), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) account for overreaction in light of two psychology biases, overconfidence and biased 
self-attribution. Overconfident investors don’t respond commensurately to public information. 
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The level of confidence of investors also grows in the framework of the biased self-attribution. 
Investors tend to credit themselves for successful investment, and blame external factors for 
losing money. Therefore, stock price is fueled by biased self-attribution, thereby leading to 
overreaction in the long run. 
Overreaction in the Options Market 
Stein (1989), Poteshman (2001), and Cao, Li, and Yu (2005) find evidence of misreaction in 
the options markets. Stein assumes that stock price volatility follows autoregressive process of 
order one or AR1 process. In his theoretical model, investors of long-maturity options are less 
subject to contemporaneous information shock than those of short-term maturity options, 
because instantaneous volatility tends to revert to a constant long-run mean volatility. However, 
the empirical evidence demonstrates that implied volatility of long-maturity options and short-
maturity options move almost in perfect lockstep. Stein interprets his findings as evidence for the 
presence of overreaction.  
Poteshman (2001) investigates the response of long- and short-term option investors in 
periods during which a series of similar information occurs. Consistent with representativeness 
bias that investors are inclined to overreact through a pattern of similar information, long-term 
option investors overreact to periods of mostly increasing or mostly decreasing daily changes in 
instantaneous variance of stock return. In contrast to Stein and Poteshman, Cao, Li, and Yu 
(2005) conclude that investors of long-term S&P 500 index options underreact to new 
information contained in short-term S&P 500 index options. Moreover, they find increasing 
misreaction after four consecutive daily variance shocks of the same sign.  
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Some of empirical research cautions against evidence of overreaction in the option markets 
because of some methodology problems and the assumption of stochastic volatility of underlying 
asset return. Diz and Finucane (1993) reexamines Stein’s finding by looking at changes in 
implied volatility, rather than levels of implied volatility for empirical testing. They find little 
evidence of overreaction, and indicate that a simple mean reverting model of implied volatility 
may not describe the time series behavior of implied volatility. Heynen, Kemna and Vorst (1994) 
analyze the term structure of implied volatility and find that EGARCH best describes stock 
volatility behavior. Consistent with market efficiency hypothesis, Cao, Li, and Yu (2005) and 
Harvey and Whaley (1992) find that option trading strategies based on misreaction are not 
profitable after taking account of transaction costs.  
Investor Style  
Some studies show that the classification of investor style (i.e., value and growth investors) 
plays a role in explaining the trading activities in response to new information shock. However, 
the number of empirical studies is small due to the lack of detailed data on investor trades. 
Rozeff and Zama (1998) find that insider purchase increases as stocks shift from growth to value 
categories. They interpret their evidence of insider trading as being consistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis that, on average, prices of value stocks tend to lie below intrinsic value, 
while prices of growth tend to lie above intrinsic value in the long run. Goetzmann and Massa 
(2002) identify classes of momentum and contrarian investors in an S&P 500 index mutual fund 
and study the responses of index fund investors to past daily price changes.  
 
 47
Hypotheses 
In light of Hong and Stein (1999)’s suggestion that momentum traders lead to overreaction, 
I propose the momentum hypothesis that the responsiveness of value investors in the options 
market is an increasing function of mostly increasing or decreasing information shock, namely, 
persistent information shock.  Suppose that prices of value stocks tend to be undervalued in the 
long run15, a series of positive information are more likely to motivate buys, resulting in 
momentum trading and the increase of trading price. Although value investors may be aware of 
long-run undervaluation of value stocks, they are not sure whether value stocks are undervalued 
in the short run. A pattern of positive information intensifies the belief of value investors that 
value stocks are undervalued. As a result, a period of positive information coupled with the 
possibility of underpriced value stocks triggers momentum trading activities.  
A smaller reaction or the reverse is likely to be true for growth stock investors. If growth 
securities are on average overvalued in the long run, growth investors conditional on short-run 
positive information shock might adopt contrarian trading activities. A period of overreaction 
likely moves trading price away from long-run fundamental valuation. Growth investors become 
suspicious of overshooting of growth stock value and they underweigh the impact of preceding 
overreaction on the price movement of growth securities.  
In addition, I expect that firm size might play a role here. Specifically, assuming that small 
stocks are characterized by a greater degree of information asymmetry, price adjustments to a 
series of similar information should be greater for small stocks than for large stocks.   
                                                 
15See Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Rozeff 
and Zaman (1998) 
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Rather than using the movement of options price that reflects changes in time and the price 
of the underlying stock, I estimate the degree of reaction of an investor by implied volatility 
inferred from options pricing models, because implied volatility is increasing in options price. I 
expect that the implied volatility of value investors increases as a pattern of mostly similar 
information enters the market, holding other factors constant. The next section discusses the 
mythology and data.  
 
 
Methodology and Data  
Using Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (1979) binomial option pricing model, I compute the implied 
volatility that accounts for the dividend yield and the possibility of early exercise for both long-
term and short-term index options. IVL,t and IVS,t represent the long- and short-term implied 
volatility at time t, , respectively. For ease of exposition, the subscript t is omitted henceforth. 
Henyen et al. (1994) examine the degree of overreaction, defined as the difference between 
actual and expected long-term implied volatility, across three different models of stochastic 
volatility.16 Let IVEL denote the expected long-term implied volatility and is estimated under 
AR1 process in the following equations:  
                                                 
16 In contrast, existing literature on stochastic volatility option pricing models focuses on a general option model that 
allows volatility to be stochastic. Those option pricing models rarely discuss the inference of overreaction in the 
option markets (e.g., Heston (1993), Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (1997), Johnson, Zuber, and Gander (2006), and 
Guidolin and Timmermann (2003)). 
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Assuming that instantaneous volatility tσ  at time t follows continuous-time mean-reverting 
AR1 process in Equation (1), the expectation of volatility at time t+j is given by Equation (2), 
whereσ is the long-run mean level of volatility, is a Wiener process, and α and β are constant 
coefficients. 
dz
ρ is the geometrically decaying parameter indicated in the AR1 process. I 
estimate ρ by the autocorrelation coefficient of short-term implied volatility at a one-day lag. 
Equation (3) shows that IVEL depends on σ , short-term implied volatility IVS, mean-reverting 
parameter ρ , and the terms to expiration T, in which T1 and T2 represent the time to expiration 
of long- and short-term options contracts, respectively.  
The second model assumes that stock return and variance follow GARCH process. GARCH 
(1, 1) is the most popular GARCH specification, described as follows. 
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where is the risk-free rate, andfr tξ is Gaussian white noise characterized by normal distribution 
N(0,1). 210  and ,, ααα  are independent parameters to describe conditional variance  at time t. 
In case of a GARCH (1, 1), IV
2
tσ
EL is obtained as follows. 
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The third model assumes that stock return and variance follow the Exponential GARCH 
or EGARCH process. EGARCH (1, 1) specifies stock return and stock return volatility as 
follows. 
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where tξ is Gaussian white noise. 210  and ,, ααα  are independent parameters. One can derive the 
following relationship between IVEL and IVS as: 
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Poteshman (2001) tests long-horizon overreaction by regressing the difference of long-term 
and short-term implied volatility on instantaneous variance. The long-term implied volatility is 
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implicitly a function of short-term implied volatility and instantaneous variance. He uses the 
cumulative sign and level of previous unexpected changes in instantaneous variance as a proxy 
for information to options traders. Largely following his approach, to test whether the cumulative 
sign of previous overreaction affect current response of long-term options investors, I construct 
the following two equations:  
SPODVIVIV SL 1321 δβββ +++=     (8) 
∑
=
−−=
w
i
itELL IVIVSPO
1
)(sign      (9) 
where IVL indicates the implied volatility of long-term options investors and V represents the 
stock price volatility. D is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the time to 
expiration of short-term options is equal to or less than three days, and zero otherwise. SPO is a 
measure of previous overreaction over a window of w trading dates and defined as the 
cumulative sign of the difference between expected and actual long-term implied volatility from 
trade date t − w to trade date t – 1.  
 In addition to testing the cumulative sign of previous overreaction, I investigate the 
impact of cumulative level of previous overreaction (LPO) on the long-term implied volatility as 
follows: 
LPODVIVIV SL 2321 δβββ +++=     (10) 
∑
=
−−=
w
i
itELL IVIVLPO
1
)(       (11) 
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where LPO is the second measure of previous overreaction over a window of w trading dates and 
defined as the cumulative level of the difference between expected and actual long-term implied 
volatility from trade date t − w to trade date t – 1.  
As discussed earlier, I expect that, for value stock options, the coefficient on SPO and LPO 
is positive and larger than that of growth stock options. 
Daily options data from 2003 to 2005 are obtained by Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE), which provides open price, close price, high and low prices, bid and ask prices, 
expiration date, open interest, and trading volume for both call and put contracts.  I use options 
on NASDAQ 100 index and Russell 2000 growth index to represent growth portfolios, while 
options on Russell 2000 value index to proxy for value portfolios. Each of the index options data 
is dividend into two subset, calls and puts. The rationale to separate the analyses of puts and puts 
is that generally trading in puts is heavier than calls. If liquidity affects pricing and thus implied 
volatility, pooling calls and puts can produce misleading results.  
Following the conventional data treatment, I limit observations to near-the-money option in 
which stock price is in the range of 10 percent of strike price. As in Stein (1989), I categorize the 
short-term options contracts with equal to or less than one-month maturity, and long-term 
options contracts with more than one-month maturity. Stock price and dividend yield are 
extracted from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and risk-free interest rate is 
obtained from the website of St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.  
 Table 1 presents the summary statistics of implied volatility. Generally speaking, the level 
of long-term implied volatility is higher than that of short-term implied volatility for three index 
options, suggesting some degree of market segmentation. The implied volatility of NASDAQ 
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100 index and Russell 2000 growth index is higher than that of Russell 2000 value index, 
irrespective of the short-term or long-term options. Higher implied volatility of growth portfolios 
is consistent with the notion that growth portfolios are perceived as being more risky and volatile 
than value portfolios. 
 
 
Regression Results and Robustness Check  
I examine the effects of prior five-day overreaction (w=5) on current reaction of 
investors. Under the assumption of AR1 stochastic volatility process, Table 2 shows the 
regression results of equations (8) and (10) in Panels A and B, respectively.  Both Panels A and 
B indicate positive coefficients on SPO and LPO for the Russell 2000 value index option and 
statistically significant at 1% level, regardless of call and put options. This finding is consistent 
with my expectation that value investors will react strongly to a pattern of similar information, as 
measured by the degree of overreaction over a window of the previous five trade dates. Panel B 
shows that the coefficients on LPO for NASDAQ 100 investors are negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level. This finding suggests that growth investors tend to underreact to a pattern 
of similar information. Holding other factors fixed, the 1% increase of prior overreaction lowers 
the subsequent implied volatility by 0.02% for NASDAQ 100 investors.  Table 2 also shows the 
results of the Chow test conducted between the value and growth indices.  The F statistics 
indicates that the joint hypothesis that all of regression coefficients are equal between the value 
and growth indices is rejected at 1% level. The evidence of structural difference suggests that 
growth and value investors respond differently to the previous overreaction.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Implied Volatility  
This table shows the mean, median and standard deviation of implied volatility based on Cox-Ross-
Rubinstein (1979) binomial option pricing model. Daily options data from 2003 to 2005 are obtained 
by Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). Each of the index options data is dividend into two subset, 
calls and puts. Following the conventional data treatment, I limit observations to near-the-money option 
in which stock price falls into 10 percent of strike price. The number of daily observations is 756. 
 
  Implied volatility  
 Mean Median Standard deviation 
CALL OPTIONS    
Russell 2000 Value    
Short-term 0.1794 0.1756 0.04080 
Long-term 0.1905 0.1908 0.02542 
Russell 2000 Growth    
Short-term 0.2241 0.2127 0.0706 
Long-term 0.2291 0.2275 0.0330 
NASDAQ 100    
Short-term 0.2101 0.1951 0.0729 
Long-term 0.2357 0.2231 0.0631 
    
PUT OPTIONS    
Russell 2000 Value    
Short-term 0.1825 0.1773 0.0433 
Long-term 0.1919 0.1903 0.0249 
Russell 2000 Growth    
Short-term 0.2264 0.2158 0.0628 
Long-term 0.2350 0.2336 0.0306 
NASDAQ 100    
Short-term 0.2155 0.2007 0.0727 
Long-term 0.2366 0.2247 0.0627 
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The magnitude and sign of δ2 among three types of investors are of interest. Panel B of 
Table 2 displays that the size of δ2 for Russell 2000 growth index is in between those of Russell 
2000 value and NASDAQ 100 index, and the coefficient is negative for NASDAQ. This suggests 
the following: Facing a series of similar information, traders in Russell 2000 value, which 
represents small value stocks, react most strongly in terms of their adjustments in implied 
volatility. The reaction is weaker for small growth stocks, proxied by Russell 2000 growth. 
Investors in large growth stocks NASDAQ, on the other hand, tend to underreact. Overall, these 
results are consistent with my expectations.  
Panel A of Table 2 displays that δ1 is significant only at 10% level for NASDAQ 100 put 
options investors and insignificant for NASDAQ 100 call options investors. The magnitude of δ1 
is very close to zero, suggesting that NASDAQ 100 investors are indifferent in the cumulative 
sign of previous five-day overreaction. One possible explanation for the neutrality of NASDAQ 
100 index to prior information is the firm size effect. Specifically, investors in larger, more liquid 
markets are less prone to overreactions. 
Turning to the pair of Russell 2000 growth and value index in Panel A, Russell 2000 
growth investors react more strongly than Russell 2000 value investors in response to the 
cumulative sign of previous five-day overreaction because of higher and statistically significant 
δ1.  However, I cautiously point out that the δ1 for both investors is small. Given one additional 
positive sign of prior overreaction, the difference of current overreaction between Russell 2000 
growth and value index is only 0.0007 for both call and put options. Table 1 indicates that the 
average long-term implied volatilities of Russell 2000 growth index are 0.2291 and 0.2350 for 
call and put options, respectively. The size of 0.0007 conditional on an additional sign of prior 
 56
overreaction suggests that Russell 2000 growth investors on average react more by only 0.3 
percent than Russell 2000 value investors. However, the issue of ordinal information contained 
in the SPO may complicate the interpretation of slightly higher overreaction of Russell 2000 
growth index, compared to Russell 2000 value index. Because SPO is a nonparametric and 
ordinal variable, the difference between a SPO of four and of three might not be the same as the 
difference between a SPO of two and of one.  In sum, Panel B of Table 2 suggests that value 
investors react more strongly than growth investors in the magnitude of prior overreaction, 
whereas Panel A of Table 2 suggests that Russell 2000 growth investors react slightly higher 
than Russell 2000 value investors in terms of the cumulative sign of prior overreaction. 
As a robustness check, I use GARCH (1, 1) and EGARCH (1, 1) model to compute SPO 
and LPO contained in a pattern of previous information over a window of five trade dates. 
Appendix shows the parameters associated with GARCH (1, 1) and EGARCH (1, 1) models. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the regression results under the assumption of GARCH (1, 1) and 
EGARCH (1, 1), respectively. Because δ2 are statistically positive for Russell 2000 value index 
and negative for NASDAQ 100 index at 1% level, and δ1 of Russell 2000 growth index is higher 
than that of Russell 2000 value index, the empirical evidence presented in Table 4 and 5 is 
quantitatively similar to that in Table 3.  Overall, I conclude that the results are robust to 
different specifications of stochastic volatility process, especially for a pattern of previous five-
day overreaction measured in levels. 
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Table 2 
Regression Results of AR1 stochastic volatility process  
This table shows the results of equation (8), assuming AR1 stochastic volatility process. Long-
term implied volatility (IVL) is regression on short-term implied volatility (IVS), stock price 
volatility (V), short-term expiration dummy (D), and the cumulative sign of previous five-day 
overreaction (SPO). D takes on the value of one if the time to expiration of short-term options is 
equal to or less than three days, and otherwise zero. The signs ***, **, * represents significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The Chow test is conducted between two pairs. The first pair consists 
of Russell 2000 Value and Growth index option, and the second one consists of Russell 2000 
Value and NASDAQ 100 index option. The F statistics of each pair is shown in the columns of 
Russell 2000 Growth index and NASDAQ 100 index, respectively.  
Panel A IVL=β1IVS+ β2V+ β3D+ δ1SPO 
CALL OPTIONS 
 
Russell 
2000 Value 
 
Russell 
2000 Growth 
 
NASDAQ 100 
β1 0.3680*** 0.2846*** 0.4917*** 
β2 0.7213*** 0.7997*** 0.6839*** 
β3 0.0064*** -0.0102*** 0.0133*** 
δ1 0.0013*** 0.0020*** -0.0001 
R2 0.9904 0.9839 0.9890 
Chow test 
F statistic  8.60*** 41.04*** 
    
PUT OPTIONS 
Russell 
2000 Value 
Russell 
2000 Growth NASDAQ 100 
β1 0.3321*** 0.2792*** 0.4139*** 
β2 0.7388*** 0.8025*** 0.7787*** 
β3 0.0036 -0.0061* 0.0016*** 
δ1 0.0023*** 0.0030*** -0.0005* 
R2 0.9899 0.9854 0.9890 
Chow test 
F statistic  4.7*** 40.87*** 
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Table 2 (Continued)  
Regression Results of AR1 stochastic volatility process  
This table shows the results of equation (10), assuming AR1 stochastic volatility process. Long-
term implied volatility (IVL) is regression on short-term implied volatility (IVS), stock price 
volatility (V), short-term expiration dummy (D), and the cumulative level of previous five-day 
overreaction (LPO). D takes on the value of one if the time to expiration of short-term options is 
equal to or less than three days, and otherwise zero. The signs ***, **, * represents significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The Chow test is conducted between two pairs. The first pair consists 
of Russell 2000 Value and Growth index option, and the second one consists of Russell 2000 
Value and NASDAQ 100 index option. The F statistics of each pair is shown in the columns of 
Russell 2000 Growth index and NASDAQ 100 index, respectively.   
Panel B IVL=β1IVS+ β2V+ β3D+ δ2LPO 
CALL OPTIONS 
Russell 
2000 Value 
Russell 
2000 Growth NASDAQ 100 
β1 0.3439*** 0.2719*** 0.5122*** 
β2 0.7143*** 0.8124*** 0.6987*** 
β3 0.0057*** -0.0099*** 0.0125*** 
δ2 0.0844*** 0.0498*** -0.279*** 
R2 0.9915 0.9838 0.9895 
Chow test 
F statistic  9.99*** 70.81*** 
    
PUT OPTIONS 
Russell 
2000 Value 
Russell 
2000 Growth NASDAQ 100 
β1 0.3017*** 0.2695*** 0.4221*** 
β2 0.7583*** 0.8366*** 0.7920*** 
β3 0.036* -0.0074** 0.0010 
δ2 0.0887*** 0.0469*** -0.0216*** 
R2 0.9908 0.9851 0.9893 
Chow test 
F statistic  5.73*** 60.61*** 
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Table 3 
Regression Results of GARCH (1, 1) stochastic volatility process  
This table shows the results of equation (8), assuming GARCH (1, 1) stochastic volatility 
process. Long-term implied volatility (IVL) is regression on short-term implied volatility (IVS), 
stock price volatility (V), short-term expiration dummy (D), and the cumulative sign of previous 
five-day overreaction (SPO). D takes on the value of one if the time to expiration of short-term 
options is equal to or less than three days, and otherwise zero. The signs ***, **, * represents 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The Chow test is conducted between two pairs. The first 
pair consists of Russell 2000 Value and Growth index option, and the second one consists of 
Russell 2000 Value and NASDAQ 100 index option. The F statistics of each pair is shown in the 
columns of Russell 2000 Growth index and NASDAQ 100 index, respectively.  
Panel A IVL=β1IVS+ β2V+ β3D+ δ1SPO 
CALL OPTIONS 
 
Russell 
2000 Value 
 
Russell 
2000 Growth 
 
NASDAQ 100 
β1 0.3682*** 0.2846*** 0.4887*** 
β2 0.7205*** 0.8000*** 0.6593*** 
β3 0.0064*** -0.0103*** 0.0142*** 
δ1 0.0013*** 0.0020*** 0.0014*** 
R2 0.9904 0.9839 0.9892 
Chow test 
F statistic  8.54*** 40.56*** 
    
PUT OPTIONS 
Russell 
2000 Value 
Russell 
2000 Growth NASDAQ 100 
β1 0.3327*** 0.2823*** 0.4169*** 
β2 0.7340*** 0.7978*** 0.7636*** 
β3 0.0033 -0.0061* 0.0025 
δ1 0.0024*** 0.0030*** 0.0002 
R2 0.9900 0.9855 0.9890 
Chow test 
F statistic  4.48*** 39.54*** 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Regression Results of GARCH (1, 1) stochastic volatility process  
This table shows the results of equation (10), assuming GARCH (1, 1) stochastic volatility 
process. Long-term implied volatility (IVL) is regression on short-term implied volatility (IVS), 
stock price volatility (V), short-term expiration dummy (D), and the cumulative level of previous 
five-day overreaction (LPO). D takes on the value of one if the time to expiration of short-term 
options is equal to or less than three days, and otherwise zero. The signs ***, **, * represents 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The Chow test is conducted between two pairs. The first 
pair consists of Russell 2000 Value and Growth index option, and the second one consists of 
Russell 2000 Value and NASDAQ 100 index option. The F statistics of each pair is shown in the 
columns of Russell 2000 Growth index and NASDAQ 100 index, respectively.   
Panel B IVL=β1IVS+ β2V+ β3D+ δ2LPO 
CALL OPTIONS 
 
Russell 
2000 Value 
 
Russell 
2000 Growth 
 
NASDAQ 100 
β 1 0.3441*** 0.2725*** 0.5040*** 
β 2 0.7140*** 0.8101*** 0.6992*** 
β 3 0.0057*** -0.0098*** 0.0130*** 
δ 2 0.0846*** 0.0529*** -0.0249*** 
R2 0.9915 0.9839 0.9893 
Chow test 
F statistic  9.47*** 61.31*** 
    
PUT OPTIONS 
Russell 
2000 Value 
Russell 
2000 Growth NASDAQ 100 
β 1 0.3030*** 0.2695*** 0.4174*** 
β 2 0.7572*** 0.8339*** 0.7870*** 
β 3 0.0036* -0.0073** 0.0015 
δ 2 0.0887*** 0.0505*** -0.0170*** 
R2 0.9909 0.9852 0.9892 
Chow test 
F statistic  5.29*** 53.15*** 
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Table 4 
Regression Results of EGARCH (1, 1) stochastic volatility process 
This table shows the results of equation (8), assuming EGARCH (1, 1) stochastic volatility 
process. Long-term implied volatility (IVL) is regression on short-term implied volatility (IVS), 
stock price volatility (V), short-term expiration dummy (D), and the cumulative sign of previous 
five-day overreaction (SPO). D takes on the value of one if the time to expiration of short-term 
options is equal to or less than three days, and otherwise zero. The signs ***, **, * represents 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The Chow test is conducted between two pairs. The first 
pair consists of Russell 2000 Value and Growth index option, and the second one consists of 
Russell 2000 Value and NASDAQ 100 index option. The F statistics of each pair is shown in the 
columns of Russell 2000 Growth index and NASDAQ 100 index, respectively.  
Panel A IVL=β1IVS+ β2V+ β3D+ δ1SPO 
CALL OPTIONS 
 
Russell 
2000 Value 
 
Russell 
2000 Growth 
 
NASDAQ 100 
β1 0.3690*** 0.2834*** 0.4900*** 
β2 0.7188*** 0.7993*** 0.6718*** 
β3 0.0066*** -0.0102*** 0.0138*** 
δ1 0.0013*** 0.0020*** 0.0007* 
R2 0.9904 0.9840 0.9891 
Chow test 
F statistic  8.84*** 40.20*** 
    
PUT OPTIONS 
Russell 
2000 Value 
Russell 
2000 Growth NASDAQ 100 
β1 0.3347*** 0.2761*** 0.4158*** 
β2 0.7233*** 0.7868*** 0.7672*** 
β3 0.0031 -0.0057* 0.0024 
δ1 0.0028*** 0.0037*** 0.0001 
R2 0.9902 0.9856 0.9890 
Chow test 
F statistic  5.10*** 42.33** 
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Table 4 (Continued)  
Regression Results of EGARCH (1, 1) stochastic volatility process 
This table shows the results of equation (10), assuming EGARCH (1, 1) stochastic volatility 
process. Long-term implied volatility (IVL) is regression on short-term implied volatility (IVS), 
stock price volatility (V), short-term expiration dummy (D), and the cumulative level of previous 
five-day overreaction (LPO). D takes on the value of one if the time to expiration of short-term 
options is equal to or less than three days, and otherwise zero. The signs ***, **, * represents 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The Chow test is conducted between two pairs. The first 
pair consists of Russell 2000 Value and Growth index option, and the second one consists of 
Russell 2000 Value and NASDAQ 100 index option. The F statistics of each pair is shown in the 
columns of Russell 2000 Growth index and NASDAQ 100 index, respectively.  
Panel B IVL=β1IVS+ β2V+ β3D+ δ2LPO 
CALL OPTIONS 
 
Russell 
2000 Value 
 
Russell 
2000 Growth 
 
NASDAQ 100 
β1 0.3430*** 0.2681*** 0.5137*** 
β2 0.7118*** 0.8124*** 0.6966*** 
β3 0.0058*** -0.0097** 0.0126*** 
δ2 0.0858*** 0.0522*** -0.0267*** 
R2 0.9915 0.9839 0.9894 
Chow test 
F statistic  10.31*** 69.28*** 
    
PUT OPTIONS 
Russell 
2000 Value 
Russell 
2000 Growth NASDAQ 100 
β1 0.3002*** 0.2667*** 0.4224*** 
β2 0.7552*** 0.8361*** 0.7900*** 
β3 0.0037* -0.0073** 0.0010 
δ2 0.0919*** 0.0488*** -0.0201*** 
R2 0.9910 0.9851 0.9893 
Chow test 
F statistic  6.03*** 60.39*** 
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Conclusions 
This paper examines the option market’s reaction to a series of preceding information 
shocks or overreactions, as measured by the difference of actual and expected long-term implied 
volatility over a window of five trade dates. Comparing the reactions between growth and value 
investors in the options market reduces, to some extent, the methodology problem and 
measurement error in testing for overreaction in the stock market. The findings mostly support 
my expectation that, after observing a series of similar information, value investors react more 
strongly than growth investors in the level of prior overreaction. Moreover, I find small stocks’ 
reactions are stronger than those of large stocks, consistent with information asymmetry being 
relatively more important for small stocks.  
In terms of the sign of prior overreaction, I find the opposite result: higher overreaction of 
Russell 2000 growth investors relative to Russell 2000 value. Whether investors perceive the 
sign and magnitude of prior overreaction as different sets of information deserves further 
analysis. Furthermore, the evidence shows that overreaction is statistically significant, but the 
degree of overreaction may be small in economic magnitude, factoring in transaction costs. An 
interesting question for future research is whether arbitrage opportunities exist after taking into 
account the substantial bid-ask spread in the options market. 
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Appendix A 
Parameter Estimates under GARCH (1, 1) 
 
 
 
Russell 2000 Value 
         Coefficient   Standard Error    
λ                      -3.725***   0.045 
α0 0.000      0.000 
α1 0.079   0.054 
α2 0.641**   0.314 
γ=α1+α2 0.720       
AIC  -4498    
 
Russell 2000 Growth 
         Coefficient   Standard Error    
λ                      -3.085***   0.045 
α0 0.000      0.000 
α1 0.053   0.042 
α2 0.753***   0.259 
γ=α1+α2 0.806       
AIC       -4214   
 
NASDAQ 100 
       Coefficient             Standard Error 
λ                      -3.396***   0.056 
α0 0.000**   0.000 
α1 0.106***   0.031 
α2 0.869***   0.032 
γ=α1+α2 0.975 
AIC -4039 
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Appendix B 
Parameter Estimates under EGARCH (1, 1) 
 
 
 
Russell 2000 Value 
                Coefficient   Standard Error 
λ                             -3.676***   0.045 
α0 -1.477   1.229 
γ=α1                         0.833***   0.139 
α2 -0.058*    0.033 
α3 0.117   0.080 
AIC           -4502 
 
Russell 2000 Growth 
                Coefficient   Standard Error 
λ                             -3.024***   0.043 
α0 -1.446   1.254 
γ=α1                         0.830***   0.148 
α2 -0.052   0.035 
α3                             0.088*   0.082 
 
AIC           -4218 
 
NASDAQ 100 
                Coefficient   Standard Error 
λ                             -3.375***   0.055 
α0 -0.416*   0.217 
γ=α1                         0.950***   0.026 
α2 0.015   0.021 
α3                             0.259***        0.062 
 
AIC           -4035 
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